Organised crime in Sweden is no longer a marginal or isolated phenomenon. It has evolved into a serious and long-term threat to fundamental societal structures. As a former police officer with several decades of experience combating organised crime, I have witnessed first-hand how criminal networks gradually build power, refine their methods, and establish influence in environments where the threat was underestimated for far too long by authorities and institutions alike.
What makes Sweden’s development particularly relevant for the Baltic states is that it clearly illustrates how organised crime takes root long before violence becomes visible. The problem did not begin with shootings or bombings. It started quietly and incrementally: through the recruitment of young people, the normalisation of criminal behaviour in digital environments, expanding drug markets, sophisticated fraud schemes, and a gradual increase in threats, pressure, and undue influence directed at key societal functions.
Undue Influence: The Most Underestimated Threat
One of the most overlooked dangers is undue influence. Criminal networks do not always rely on overt violence to assert control. Instead, they employ subtle and strategic methods such as intimidation, disinformation, the spreading of rumours, economic pressure, infiltration, and manipulation. This influence is often directed at public officials, decision-makers, businesses, and other actors who stand in the way of criminal interests.
The result is frequently self-censorship, silence, and excessive caution. Over time, this erodes the resilience of the state and society—often without triggering immediate alarm. Once such influence becomes normalised, the room for manoeuvre shrinks rapidly.
Sweden’s Key Mistake: Acting Too Late
Sweden’s greatest failure was not a lack of warning signs, but delayed and fragmented responses. When criminal structures gain economic power and institutional footholds, they become extremely difficult and costly to dismantle. Prevention is always more effective than reaction.
Why This Matters for the Baltic States
For the Baltic states, this experience is highly relevant. Contemporary organised crime is cross-border, digital, and highly adaptable. Fraud, money laundering, recruitment, and coercive pressure increasingly take place across national borders—often without perpetrators ever being physically present in the affected country.
Highly digitalised societies, open economies, and high levels of social trust can become attractive targets if early warning signs are ignored.
Key Lessons from Sweden’s Experience
Based on Sweden’s trajectory, several clear lessons emerge for the Baltic states:
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Low levels of violence do not equal low risk. Early indicators such as fraud, economic crime, and informal influence must be treated with utmost seriousness.
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Undue influence must be systematically documented and countered. Even low-intensity pressure is a deliberate and strategic tool used by criminal networks.
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Economic crime is a security issue. Fraud and money laundering are not secondary crimes—they are core revenue streams for organised crime.
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Young people must be protected from digital recruitment. Today, recruitment often occurs online, across borders, and independent of specific platforms.
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Coordination is essential. Fragmented responses benefit criminal actors, while shared situational awareness strengthens national resilience.
A Narrow Window of Opportunity
Sweden’s experience demonstrates that organised crime is patient, strategic, and long-term in its approach. The Baltic states still have an opportunity to act earlier—and in a more coordinated manner—than Sweden did.
However, this window of opportunity is not unlimited.
Ignoring early warning signs is not neutrality.
It is a choice — and it comes with consequences.
#KristofferSamsing #OrganisedCrime #BalticStates #NationalSecurity #EconomicCrime #UndueInfluence #EuropeanSecurity
Kristoffer Samsing on Organised Crime, Undue Influence, and State Resilience in Europe
